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Abstract
This article studies the consequences of firm delayering on wages and the wage
distribution inside firms. I consider a job-assignment model with asymmetric in-
formation and a slot constraint. The model predicts that more efficient firms are
not necessarily larger than less efficient firms if firms are allowed to adjust their
internal organizational structure through delayering. After delayering, wages at all
levels increase and the wage distribution becomes more unequal. These predictions
match a set of empirical findings in recent studies that are not well explained by
existing theories.
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1 Introduction
Firms organize their workers into hierarchies to carry out production (Williamson,
1967; Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; Rosen, 1982). The hierarchical structure of firms
is closely related to individuals’ career and wage dynamics. In the past thirty years,
firms became flatter, i.e., they got rid of some layers in their corporate hierarchy.
This delayering trend is well documented in numerous studies using large-scale
firm-level data sets from several developed countries (Colombo and Delmastro,
1999;2008; Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Caliendo et al., 2012). Widely identified and
most convincing causes of this trend are the increased competition in the product
market (Bloom et al., 2010; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010), the improvement in corpo-
rate governance, and the advancement of information technology (Garicano, 2000;
Bresnahan et al., 2002).
While the causes of this delayering trend are extensively studied, the conse-
quences of this change, especially the impact on individuals’ wages and the wage
distribution within a firm, are not well explored.1 In this essay, I build a model to
explain two empirical regularities found in the recent literature. First, after firms de-
layer, wages at all levels increase (Bauer and Bender, 2001; Rajan and Wulf, 2006;
Caliendo et al., 2012). Second, after delayering, the wage distribution becomes
more unequal (Bauer and Bender, 2001).
To explain these wage patterns associated with delayering, I consider a job-
assignment model with slot constraints and asymmetric information. In this set
1Numerous studies in the management and human resource literature explore the relationship
between firm delayering and subsequent firm performance. The conclusion is mixed. For example,
Carzo and Yanouzas (1969) find that tall organizations are more profitable, while Shaw and Schneier
(1993), Cristini et al. (2003), and Kuhn (2011) find that the opposite is true.
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up, workers compete for a single position at the upper level. Outside firms do not
observe workers’ outputs but can make inferences about workers’ abilities using
promotions as signals (Waldman, 1984a). In addition, I assume that workers some-
times leave their positions for exogenous reasons following Greenwald (1986). The
main intuition in this model is that, holding firm size constant, the contestants’ pool
is larger in a flatter firm than in the firm with more layers. Therefore, winning a
promotion in a flatter firm sends a more positive signal about the winner’s ability.2
In addition, losing a promotion in a larger contest sends a more positive signal about
losers’ abilities as well. This is because losing a larger contest does not necessarily
mean that a worker is incompetent but rather that she is not the best among many
workers. Thus, after delayering, wages at all levels go up. In addition, because
the market expectation about the winner’s ability goes up faster than the market
expectation about losers’ abilities, the wage gap between the winner and the losers
widens after delayering.
Three key features of the model are essential to the resulting wage patterns.
First, there is asymmetric learning among firms about workers’ abilities. With
asymmetric learning, workers’ wages are determined by their “market value”, which
is based on their job assignments. Second, the upper level positions are character-
ized by a slot constraint. Without a slot constraint, after delayering, there would be
an upward adjustment in the expectation about the workers’ ability at the low level
job and a non-upward adjustment in the expectation about the workers’ ability at the
upper-level job so that the wage distribution would become more equal.3 Third, due
2This argument is related to discussions in Prendergast (1999) and Waldman (2013).
3For example, suppose there are three types of workers with high, regular, or low ability working
for a three-layer firm. The high ability individual is at the top, the regular ability individual is in the
middle, and the low ability individual is at the bottom. After delayering, since the regular worker
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to the existence of exogenous job movers, my model alleviates the “winner’s curse”
problem that is common in models with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Os-
ter, 1987). Without exogenous movers, if a worker is not promoted, the market
would not want to offer a wage that is higher than the lowest expected productiv-
ity. If a worker’s previous employer learns her ability perfectly after one period
as assumed in Waldman (1984a) and Zabojnik and Bernhardt (1995), this lowest
expected productivity does not change and so delayering would not affect the wage
for low level workers.
This essay contributes to the literature in several different ways. First, it con-
tributes to the delayering literature by exploring the effects of delayering on wage
changes. Second, it contributes to the job assignment literature by considering how
firms’ organization structure affects wages. This essay also captures several empir-
ical findings that are not well explained in the existing literature.
The organization of this essay is as follows. In Section 2, I review related lit-
erature. Section 3 discusses the model set up. In Section 4, I first analyze a model
with two layers, and then compare the results to a three-layer model. Section 5
concludes.
is not good enough for the top level job, she would join the low ability worker on the low level
job. As a result, the average ability at the top is unchanged while the average ability at the bottom
rises. Suppose there is a continuum of workers’ types, some middle level workers would join the top
level job, and some middle level workers would join the bottom level job. As a result, the average
ability at the top falls while the average ability at the bottom rises. Since workers’ wages are largely
attached to their expected ability (productivity), wages in the firm become more equal.
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2 Related Literature
As I discussed in the introduction, most of the empirical literature on delayering
has focused on the causes of delayering (Garicano, 2000; Bresnahan et al., 2002;
Bloom et al., 2010; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010). Several recent studies have doc-
umented some new wage patterns related to firm delayering. For example, using
data from more than 300 US firms from 1986-1998, Rajan and Wulf (2006) find
that after delayering, the division managers are paid more in salary and bonus after
controlling for firm size and firm fixed effects. Internationally, using a comprehen-
sive sample of French manufacturing firms, Caliendo et al. (2012) find that after
delayering, wages at all levels of the firm increases. In an earlier study using a
nationally representative linked employer-employee panel dataset from Germany,
Bauer and Bender (2001) find that average wages increase after firms delayer. The
wage distribution also becomes more unequal.
Two existing theories have addressed the relationship between delayering and
wage distributions within firms. The first stream of literature is based on the command-
and-control argument. Qian (1994) extends Calvo and Wellisz (1979) by endoge-
nizing the number of layers in a hierarchy. The main mechanism is that since the
entrepreneur’s attention is limited, the further down a worker is in the hierarchy,
the looser the control is and the lower the worker’s effort is. Since the optimal
number of layers decreases as the capital stock shrinks, workers who remain in the
same position relative to the bottom receive a higher wage due to an increase in
control with a shorter chain-of-command and workers who remain in the same po-
sition relative to the top receive a lower wage due to a decrease in monitoring with
a larger span. That is, delayering is associated with a wage increase at the lower
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level and a wage decrease at the top. This prediction is inconsistent with the recent
findings in the delayering literature and the more established stylized fact that the
CEO-to-average-wage ratio has increased dramatically over the past thirty years.4
The other strand of literature takes the knowledge hierarchy approach (Gari-
cano, 2000). Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) study a model in which firms
eliminate layers in response to negative demand shocks. Since the total knowl-
edge for production is unchanged, as the number of layers decreases, the knowl-
edge and thus wages in all pre-existing layers rise. In another study, Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) consider a model with homogeneous firms and heteroge-
neous workers. In their model, as the cost of acquiring knowledge decreases, fewer
layers are preferred and managers acquire more knowledge. Since the knowledge
increases more at the top, the overall wage inequality increases. While Caliendo and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012) provide an explanation for why wages at all levels increase
after delayering, they do not explain why wage inequality rises after delayering. On
the other hand, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) explain why wage inequality
rises after delayering, but they do not explain why wages at all levels increase af-
ter delayering. My analysis captures both wage patterns associated with delayering
under a single theoretical framework.
My model is built on the promotion-as-signal approach found initially in Wald-
man (1984a).5 Using this approach, Waldman (1984a) and various extensions cap-
4For example, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) find that from 1970 to 2000, the ratio of CEO cash
compensation to average pay for production workers increased from 25 to 2000.
5The promotion-as-signal approach assumes asymmetric learning in the labor market which
means a worker’s current employer knows more about the worker’s true ability than outside firms do.
A competing modeling framework is to assume symmetric learning where all firms have the same
information about a worker’s type (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999).
Although both frameworks can explain various stylized facts concerning wage and promotion dy-
namics inside firms, many recent empirical studies have found evidence in favor of the asymmetric
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ture many stylized facts about wage and promotion dynamics, such as large wage in-
creases upon promotion (Bernhardt, 1995) and the wage-and-firm-size effect (Zabo-
jnik and Bernhardt, 2001), etc. This paper adds to the promotion-as-signal literature
by looking at the effect of delayering on wages.
This model’s set up is closely related to Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001). Zabo-
jnik and Bernhardt (2001) consider a model with slot constraints to explore the
firm-wage-size relation. The main focus in their model is on how promotion can
induce optimal human capital investment. In this paper, on the other hand, I ex-
plore the implications of slot constraints and firms’ hierarchical structural changes
on wage distributions. I also show that, different from the prediction in Zabojnik
and Bernhardt (2001), more efficient firms are not necessarily larger when we take
into account the internal structure of the firm.
3 The Model
In this section I set up a two-period model. There are F(> 2) identical firms in
the market. Each firm hires n risk-neutral young workers in period 1 (and firms
can choose to vary their sizes in period 2). Different jobs in a firm have different
production efficiencies, denoted by V . The production efficiency translates work-
ers’ ability into output. Workers are ex ante identical and have two-period careers.
I refer to an individual in her first work period as young, and those who are in
their second work period as old. Worker i’s ability, θi, is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [θL,θH ].
learning framework (Pinkston, 2009; DeVaro and Waldman, 2012; Kahn, 2013). I thus adopt the
asymmetric learning framework in this essay.
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An individual with ability θ who is assigned to a job with production efficiency
V produces stVθ units of output in period t. st = S > 1 for an old worker who
remains at her previous period’s employer and st = 1 for a young worker or for
an old worker who just starts to work for a new firm. st thus captures firm specific
human capital. The total production at each firm is the sum of each worker’s output.
I refer to a worker’s previous period’s employer as the incumbent firm and all other
firms as outside firms.
I assume there is over-supply of labor in the economy meaning that there are
more than n ·F workers. All the workers who are not hired by the firms stay self-
employed. Following Waldman and Zax (2013), I assume that there is learning-by-
doing in self-employment: a worker in her first period of self-employment produces
U¯1 and a worker in her second period of self-employment produces U¯2, where U¯2 >
U¯1. If a worker works for a firm in period 1 and becomes self-employed in period
2, she can only produce U¯1 in period 2. I assume SVθL > U¯1, which means working
for a firm in period 2 is better than self-employment if a worker has worked for
a firm in period 1. This condition guarantees that workers do not change from
working for a firm to self-employment between two periods. Furthermore, I assume
U¯1 + U¯2 > (1+ S)V E(θ), where E(θ) is the unconditional mean of a worker’s
ability. This condition guarantees that a firm hires a finite number of workers. This
is because if firms hire an infinite number of workers, the total expected productivity
and thus wage pay of each worker is (1+ S)V E(θ). If this value is smaller than
workers’ total income from self-employment for two periods, U¯1 +U¯2, no worker
would choose employment at a firm over self-employment. This regulates the firms
not to hire an infinite number of workers.
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Following Greenwald (1986), I assume a small probability, λ , that workers leave
the firm for exogenous reasons. I consider the equilibrium behavior where λ → 0.
In addition, I assume that the firm-specific human capital is sufficiently large that
an incumbent worker is always more productive than an outside worker.
The timing of the events is the following. At the beginning of period 1, nature
assigns an ability type to each worker. Firms decide the optimal number of young
workers to hire and offer wages accordingly. Workers choose the firm with the
highest wage offer to work at. At the end of period 1, incumbent firms privately
observe workers’ outputs. At the beginning of period 2, incumbent firms update
their beliefs about workers’ types and one of the young workers is chosen to fill
the upper level position if there is a vacancy at the upper level. Outside firms ob-
serve the incumbent firms’ job assignment decisions and update their belief about
workers’ types. All firms then make wage offers simultaneously. Workers privately
learn about their job-switching types and the exogenous movers depart. Workers
then choose the firm with the highest wage offer to work at for period 2. If there are
multiple firms offering the same highest wage, a worker chooses randomly among
those highest-wage-offer firms but stays with her incumbent firm if her incumbent
firm is one of the highest-wage-offer firms.
4 The Analysis
In equilibrium, firms assign workers to jobs and offer wages accordingly. I focus
on the perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game. I first discuss equilibrium
behavior in a two-layer firm and then I discuss and compare equilibrium behavior
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in a three-layer firm. Both models are solved by backward induction.
4.1 A two-layer model
Let us first consider the wage setting process in a two-layer firm. A two-layer firm
consists of a CEO position (E) at the upper level and a number of laborer positions
(L) at the lower level. Let V j, j ∈ {E,L} denote the production efficiency in job j.
I assume V E >V L, which means the upper-level jobs have greater marginal returns
to ability as in Sattinger (1975) and Rosen (1982).
In period 1, n young workers are hired into the laborer positions in each firm.
In period 2, when the workers are old, one of them will be chosen to fill the CEO
position (the CEO position remains unfilled in the first period). Since V E > V L,
firms always have an incentive to assign the highest ability worker to the CEO
position because this worker has the largest output increase if placed in the CEO
position instead of a laborer position. In addition, due to the firm specific human
capital, an incumbent firm can extract the highest rent from placing the most able
worker in the CEO position.
In period 2, after observing a young worker’s job assignment at her incumbent
firm, outside firms form expectations about the worker’s ability. Denote the ex-
pected ability of the promoted worker (i.e., the tournament winner) θE(n) and the
expected ability of a non-promoted worker (i.e., a tournament loser) θL(n). Then
θE(n)=E(θi|i is the best among n laborers) and θL(n)=E(θi|i is not the best among n laborers).
Note that the expected ability is a function of the number of contestants in the pro-
motion tournament only. W E(V,n) denotes the wage of the tournament winner who
is promoted to the CEO position. W L(V,n) denotes the wage of the laborers who
9
do not win the tournament. Proposition 1 describes the wages for the old workers
in a two-layer firm. All proofs are reserved for the Appendix.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, an old worker’s wage is equal to her expected pro-
ductivity at an outside firm given her job assignment, i.e., W E(V,n) =V LθE(n) and
W L(V,n) = V LθL(n). The wage difference between the CEO and the laborers is
∆W =W E(V,n)−W L(V,n), which increases in the total number of workers in the
laborer level n.
Proposition 1 says that the old workers’ wages are equal to their expected pro-
ductivities at an outside firm, which are determined by their expected abilities as
well as the production efficiency. Note that the wage paid to a tournament winner is
evaluated at the laborer level. This is because firms are slot constrained at the upper
level. In addition, due to the firm-specific human capital, an “insider" is more pro-
ductive than an “outsider". Thus, firms do not replace an incumbent with an outside
worker. Therefore, firms can only offer a wage that is consistent with assigning an
outside worker to the lower level job.
Consider how the wage inequality, ∆W =V L[θE(n)−θL(n)], changes with the
total number of young workers hired into the laborer positions in period 1. When
the pool of young workers (i.e. contestants) becomes larger, the winner’s expected
ability rises because the winner of a larger contest signals more strongly about her
ability. On the other hand, the loser’s expected ability also rises since not being the
best among n laborers is a less bad outcome if n is larger.
To better illustrate this point, let us compare a two-person contest versus an n-
person contest. Ex ante, the two groups of workers have the same expected ability.
Ex post, since the expected ability of the winner from the two-person contest is
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above average, the loser’s expected ability should be below average. That is, the
“penalty” on losers’ expected ability is fully absorbed by this one “loser”. On the
other hand, although the expected ability of the winner from the n-person contest is
larger than that from the two-person contest, the penalty on losers’ expected ability
is averaged across many losers. The more the workers are in the promotion con-
test, the lower the penalty is on each losers’ expected ability, and the closer the
losers’ expected ability is to the unconditional mean ability. In the extreme, when
the size of the contestants’ pool approaches infinity, the non-promoted workers’ ex-
pected ability approaches the unconditional mean. Therefore, the expected ability
of the losers from a larger contest is larger than the expected ability of the losers
from a smaller contest.6 When workers’ ability is uniformly distributed, the ex-
pected ability for a tournament winner grows faster than the expected ability for
a tournament loser as the size of the contestants’ pool increases. To see this, note
that θE(n)−θL(n) = θH−θL2 · 11+1/n . Thus, the wage gap between the winner and the
losers widens monotonically with the size of the contestants’ pool, i.e., ∂W/∂n> 0.
Now, let us consider how firms choose the optimal number of young laborers to
hire in period 1. Let n denote the number of young laborers. W LY denote the first
period’s wage for young laborers, which is a function of n. The firms’ problem is
the following.
Max
n
nV LE(θ)−nW LY (n)+ [SV EθE(n)−W E(V,n)] (1)
+(n−1)[SV LθL(n)−W L(V,n)]
s.t. W LY (n)+ [
1
nW
E(V,n)+ n−1n W
L(V,n)]≥ U¯1+U¯2, (2)
6Waldman (2013) makes a similar argument and he illustrates this argument by considering a
binomial case where workers are either good or bad. See footnote 19 in Waldman (2013).
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(2) is workers’ participation constraint that a worker is better off choosing work-
ing for a firm for two periods than staying self-employed for two periods. That
is, the overall lifetime income should be at least the amount of what the self-
employment pays. In equilibrium, the participation constraint binds. The first-order
condition to the above problem is
S(V E −V L)θH−θL
(n+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)V LE(θ). (3)
From (3), if we hold the production efficiency at the laborer level (V L) constant
but increase the production efficiency at the CEO level (V E), the total number of
young workers hired increases. The intuition is that as the CEO job becomes more
efficient, firms can extract more rents from the CEO worker if this worker is more
able. Firms achieve this sorting by increasing the contestants’ pool. I summarize
this property in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The total number of young workers hired in period 1 increases with
V E , holding V L constant.
From Proposition 2, a firm with a more efficient production technology at the
CEO level hires more young workers and the market expectation about the CEO’s
ability increases with the number of young workers competing in the promotion
tournament. Thus, if the CEO job becomes more efficient, the firm grows holding
the firm structure constant. As shown in Proposition 1 , when firms grow, wages
at all levels go up and the wage distribution becomes more unequal. I summarize
these relationships in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3. Consider two firms with two layers. Suppose V E1 > V
E
2 ,V
L
1 = V
L
2 ,
then n1 > n2,W
j
1 >W
j
2 , j ∈ {E,L}, and ∆W1 > ∆W2.
The wage patterns described in Proposition 3 are driven by the difference in
the production technology. The two-period model shows that firms will adjust their
sizes in response to technology changes while firm structure is held constant. That
is, firms with more efficient production technology at the CEO level are larger.
However, Rajan and Wulf (2006) find that firm sizes are relatively stable over time
in their dataset although there has been substantial technology advancements during
their sample period. This suggests that firms adjust to technology changes through
changes in firm structure while holding firm size constant. Before I discuss how
firms’ structure changes with technology, let me first consider a three-layer model
in the following section.
4.2 A three-layer model
In a three-layer firm, the CEO (E) occupies the top level, managers (M) stay on the
middle management level, and laborers (L) take up the lower level. Each manager
heads a division with a team of laborers. All managers report directly to the CEO.
The production efficiency at each job level is denoted by Vˆ j, j ∈ {E,M,L}. Similar
to the two layer case, an upper level job is more efficient in utilizing workers’ ability
than a lower level job, i.e., Vˆ E > Vˆ M > Vˆ L. The production function is the same as
before. An individual with ability θ who is assigned to job j produces SVˆ jθ units
of output if she is old and works for her incumbent firm; Vˆ jθ otherwise.
Firms live for two periods. In period 1, mˆ young workers are hired into the
management positions in each firm and nˆ young workers are hired into the laborer
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positions in each management division, i.e., mˆ · (nˆ+1) young workers are hired in
each firm in period 1. In period 2, when the workers are old, one of the managers
will be chosen to fill the CEO position. After the tournament at the management
level, the laborers in the promoted manager’s division compete for the manage-
ment vacancy. I assume that the CEO job requires some manager-specific human
capital that only those who have worked as a manager can work as a CEO. I also
assume that there is some division-specific human capital that only the laborers in
a particular division can work as the manager in that division.7
The firm’s problem at the management level in the three-layer model is very
similar to the one in the two-layer model. In period 2, after observing a man-
ager’s job assignment decisions made by her incumbent firm, outside firms form
expectations about the manager’s ability. I assume that the management production
efficiency is not very different from the laborer production efficiency so that there
are no demotions.8 Thus, a manager is either promoted to be the CEO or remains on
the management level. Denote the expected ability of the promoted manager (i.e.,
the CEO) θEP (mˆ) and the expected ability of a non-promoted manager θMN (mˆ). Then
θEP (mˆ) = E(θi|i is the best among mˆ managers) and θMN (mˆ) = E(θi|i is not the best
among mˆ managers).
At the laborer level, only one laborer in the division with a management va-
7This assumption rules out cross-division promotions. Otherwise there are more laborers com-
peting for a single management position than managers competing for the CEO position such that
the wage of the winning laborer exceeds the wage of the CEO, which is counterfactual. See Friebel
and Raith (2013) for a theoretical analysis where cross-division promotions are allowed.
8It is possible that firms would want to demote a manager and replace her with a more competent
laborer after their true abilities are revealed. However, in doing so, the incumbent firm would send
a strong signal to the market about the laborer’s ability such that the productivity gain could not
compensate for the increase in the wage bill. Thus, if the manager-level production efficiency is not
sufficiently different from the laborer-level production efficiency, demotions will not occur.
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cancy will be promoted to become a manager. Outside firms only observe work-
ers’ job assignments but they do not observe in which division a management va-
cancy becomes available. Since all firms are identical, firms know the number
of equilibrium young managers that other firms hire. Thus, if a laborer is pro-
moted to be a manager, the expected ability of the promoted laborer is 1mˆθ
M
P (nˆ) =
1
mˆE(θi|i is the best among nˆ laborers ). The expected ability of the non-promoted
laborer is 1mˆθ
L
N(nˆ)+(1− 1mˆ)E(θ)= 1mˆE(θi|i is not the best among nˆ laborers)+(1−
1
mˆ)E(θ).
Now let us consider the second-period wages in a three-layer model. Wˆ EP (Vˆ , mˆ)
is the wage for a CEO who is promoted from a management position. Wˆ MN (Vˆ , mˆ)
is the wage for a manager who is not promoted to be a CEO from a management
position. Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) is the wage for a manager who is just promoted to be a
manger from a laborer position. Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) is the wage for a laborer who is not
promoted to be a manger from a laborer position. Proposition 4 describes the wages
for the old workers in three-layer firms.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, an old worker’s wage is equal to her expected pro-
ductivity at an outside firm given her job assignment. At the management level, a
promoted manager’s wage is Wˆ EP (Vˆ , mˆ)= Vˆ
LθEP (mˆ) and a non-promoted manager’s
wage is Wˆ MN (Vˆ , mˆ) = Vˆ
LθMN (mˆ). At the laborer level, a promoted laborer’s wage
is Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) = Vˆ
L[ 1mˆθ
M
P (nˆ)]; a non-promoted laborer’s wage is Wˆ
L
N (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ) =
Vˆ L[ 1mˆθ
L
N(nˆ)+(1− 1mˆ)E(θ)].
I now consider the first-period problem in each firm. In period 1, at the manage-
ment level, firms choose a wage for young managers and decide how many man-
agers to hire into the management position. Let mˆ denotes the number of young
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managers to hire. Wˆ MY denote the first period’s wage for young managers, which is
a function of mˆ. The problem at the management level is the following.
Max
mˆ
mˆVˆ ME(θ)− mˆWˆ MY (mˆ)+ [SVˆ EθEP (mˆ)−Wˆ EP (Vˆ , mˆ)] (4)
+(mˆ−1)[SVˆ MθMN (mˆ)−Wˆ MN (Vˆ , mˆ)]
s.t. Wˆ MY (mˆ)+ [
1
mˆWˆ
E
P (Vˆ , mˆ)+
mˆ−1
mˆ Wˆ
M
N (Vˆ , mˆ)]≥ U¯1+U¯2 (5)
(5) is a worker’s participation constraint. U¯1+U¯2 is a worker’s expected lifetime
income if she stays self-employed. That is, the young managers’ wage is such that
she is indifferent between working or staying self-employed for two periods. The
first-order condition that characterizes the problem in (4) is
S(Vˆ E −Vˆ M) θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ). (6)
Note that the total number of young managers to hire is independent of the
number of laborers and is determined only by the production efficiencies at the
CEO level and the management level.
The problem at the laborers’ level is similar to the problem at the management
level. The only difference is that there might be no vacancy in a laborer’s division.
Let nˆ denote the number of young laborers to hire. Wˆ LY (nˆ) denotes the first period’s
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wage for young laborers. The problem at the laborer level is the following.
Max
nˆ
nˆVˆ LE(θ)− nˆWˆ LY (nˆ)+(1−
1
mˆ
)[nˆSVˆ LE(θ)− nˆWˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)] (7)
+
1
mˆ
{[SVˆθMP (nˆ)−Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)]+(nˆ−1)[SVˆ LθLN(nˆ)−Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)]}
s.t. Wˆ LY (nˆ)+(1−
1
mˆ
)Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)
+
1
mˆ
[
1
nˆ
Wˆ MP (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)+
nˆ−1
nˆ
Wˆ LN (Vˆ , mˆ, nˆ)]≥ U¯1+U¯2 (8)
Similar to the manager’s problem, (8) is a worker’s participation constraint. The
first-order condition that characterizes the problem in (7) is
1
mˆ
S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L)θH−θL
(nˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ LE(θ). (9)
From (9), the more young managers there are, the fewer young laborers there
are in each division. The intuition is that if there are many managers, the probability
that a vacancy occurs is low. Thus, it is less likely that a firm can extract the rent by
placing a more able worker into the management position. As a result, firms hire
fewer laborers.
Compare the period-1’s problem at the management level and at the laborer
level. If the difference in terms of production efficiency between the CEO job
and the manager job is larger than the difference between the manager job and the
laborer job, the CEO would have a larger span-of-control than the managers. That
is,
Proposition 5. If Vˆ E −Vˆ M > Vˆ M−Vˆ L, then mˆ > nˆ.
Proposition 5 says that upper-level managers have a larger span than lower-level
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managers. This is due to the mechanism that firms have the incentive to assign more
able workers to more efficient jobs and the sorting is achieved through increasing
the number of contestant in a promotion tournament.
4.3 Technology, delayering, and wages
Now, we are ready to analyze the relationship between delayering and wages. Let
us first look at the relationship between technology changes, firm sizes, and firm
structure. We know from the delayering literature that one of the main causes of firm
delayering is technology advancement. Thus, I consider an exogenous technology
shock that changes the production efficiency at the CEO level in a three-layer firm
from Vˆ E to V E and the firm decides to restructure into a two-layer firm. Since Rajan
and Wulf (2006) find that firms’ sizes are relatively stable over the years, I assume
that the firm now hires the same number of workers as before, i.e., N = Nˆ. I have
the following Proposition.
Proposition 6. If firm size and the production efficiency at the laborer level are
unchanged, the CEO’s production efficiency must be higher after delayering, i.e. if
Nˆ = N,Vˆ L =V L, then it must be that V E > Vˆ E .
The logic behind Proposition 6 is the following. If a firm only has two layers,
all workers are led by the CEO. If a firm has three layers, the CEO only leads the
managers. If the firm has the same number of workers after delayering, it must be
that the CEO in the two-layer firm leads a larger production team, which means she
is more efficient. Note that Proposition 6 considers within firm changes rather than
a cross firm comparison.
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Now, let us consider delayering and wage changes. If we compare the non-
promoted laborers’ wage, Wˆ LN , in the three-layer model to that in the two-layer
model, W L, we can see that the laborers’ wage is higher in a two-layer firm, holding
firm size and the production efficiency at the laborer level constant. The reason is
that the two-layer firm has a larger contestant pool such that the expected ability of
a loser is higher than the expected ability of a loser in a smaller contest. Since the
production efficiency at the laborer level is unchanged, the flatter firm pays a higher
non-promotion wage to the laborers. Similar argument applies to the wages paid to
the CEOs in the two-layer firm and the three-layer firm. That is, after delayering,
the CEO and the laborers are paid more because of an upward adjustment in their
expected abilities.
With regard to the wage difference between the CEO and the laborer, when the
market expectation about the non-promoted laborers’ ability increases, the market
expectation about the CEO’s ability also increases. With a uniform ability distribu-
tion, the difference between these two expectations becomes larger as the number
of contestants gets larger. That is, after delayering, the wage distribution within a
firm becomes more unequal. I summarize the above argument in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Suppose there is a technology change that results in a higher CEO
production efficiency, i.e., V E > Vˆ E , and delayering. If firm size and the produc-
tion efficiency at the laborer level are unchanged, both the laborers and the CEO’s
wages increase, i.e., if Nˆ = N,Vˆ L = V L, then W E > Wˆ EP ,W
L > Wˆ LN . In addition,
∆W =W E −W L > ∆Wˆ = Wˆ EP −Wˆ LN
The predictions in Proposition 7 capture the empirical findings in the delayering
literature that when firms become flatter, wages at all level go up (Bauer and Bender,
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2001; Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Caliendo et al., 2012) and wage inequality increases
(Bauer and Bender, 2001).
In Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), more efficient firms are larger given that all
firms have the same number of layers. From Proposition 6, a more efficient firm
(measured by the production efficiency at the CEO level) is not necessarily larger
than a less-efficient firm if we take into account firm restructuring. This result is
consistent with the empirical finding in Rajan and Wulf (2006) that firms have fewer
layers without much changes in firm size over time.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model with asymmetric learning and slot constraints to ex-
plore the relationship between firm delayering and workers’ wages. It contributes
to the literature in multiple ways. First, it contributes to the delayering literature by
exploring the consequences of delayering on wages while most of the delayering
literature focuses on the causes of the delayering trend. Second, it contributes to
the job assignment literature by considering how firms’ organization structure af-
fects wages. Third, this model captures several empirical findings that are not well
explained in the existing literature. My model shows that after delayering, workers’
wages at all levels increase because they are now participating in a larger contest
and thus their expected abilities are higher. In addition, since the workers’ wage at
the top increases faster than the wage increase at the bottom, the wage distribution
becomes more unequal after delayering.
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7 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and 4. Consider a production unit with production efficiency
V employing n young workers. In period 2, outside firms form expectations about
old workers’ ability denoted as θ e. Due to the existence of the exogenous movers,
the market expectation is free of the winner’s curse. Since there are multiple firms,
the standard result is that the market value of the worker is at her expected produc-
tivity, which equals to Vθ e. Since the worker can produce more at her incumbent
firm, her first-period employer has an incentive to match her market value.‖
Proof of Proposition 2. From (3) , since the RHS is unchanged, when V E goes
up, n goes up. ‖
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 2, since V E1 > V
E
2 ,V
L
1 = V
L
2 , then
n1 > n2. Since {θi}, i ∈ 1, . . . ,n, follows uniform distribution, f (θ) = 1/(θH −
θL),F(θ) = (θ − θL)/(θH − θL). Prob.(θi is the largest among n)=Fn(θ). Thus,
E(θi|θi is the largest among n) =
∫ θH
θL θ · n f (θ)Fn−1(θ)dθ = (nθH + θL)/(n+ 1),
which increases in n. Since n1 > n2, E(θi|θi is the largest among n1) > E(θi|θi is
the largest among n2). Thus, W E1 >W
E
2 . From the law of total expectation, E(θ) =
E(θ |θ is not the largest among n)·P(θ is not the largest among n)+E(θ |θ is the
largest among n)·P(θ is the largest among n),(θH+θL)/2=E(θ |θ not largest)(1−
1/n)+(nθH+θL)/(n+1)(1/n).E(θ |θ not the largest)= [n(θH+θL)+2θL]/[2(n+
1)], which also increases in n. Thus, the laborers’ wage also increases, i.e., W L1 >
W L2 . As for the wage difference, ∆W = (V
E −V L)θE(n)+V L[θE(n)−θL(n)]. We
know θE(n) increases in n. θE(n)−θL(n) = θH−θL2 · nn+1 , which also increases in
n. Thus ∆W1 > ∆W2. ‖
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Proof of Proposition 5. Note that θE +(n− 1)θL = nE(θ). Thus, the maxi-
mization problem at the two-layer firm can be re-write into
Max
n
nV LE(θ)+S(V E −V L)θE(n)+SV Ln nE(θ)−n(U¯1+U¯2).
I re-write as follows the three first-order conditions that pin down the equilibrium
number of young workers in the three-layer firm and the two-layer firm.
S(V E −V L) θH−θL
(N+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)V LE(θ) (10)
S(Vˆ E −Vˆ M) θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ) (11)
1
mˆ
S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L)θH−θL
(nˆ+1)2
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ LE(θ) (12)
From (12) over (11) , Vˆ
M−Vˆ L
Vˆ E−Vˆ M ·
(mˆ+1)2
mˆ(nˆ+1)2 =
(U¯1+U¯2)−(1+S)Vˆ LE(θ)
(U¯1+U¯2)−(1+S)Vˆ ME(θ) . Then the RHS>1.
Suppose nˆ > mˆ. Since Vˆ
M−Vˆ L
Vˆ E−Vˆ M < 1,
(mˆ+1)2
mˆ(nˆ+1)2 < 1, the LHS < 1. Contradiction. Thus,
nˆ < mˆ.‖
Proof of Proposition 6. From (11),
S[(Vˆ E −Vˆ M) − (Vˆ M−Vˆ L)] θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
(13)
= (U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ)−S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L) θH−θL
(mˆ+1)2
.
From (10) over (14), we have
V E −V L
Vˆ E −Vˆ L
(mˆ+1)2
(N+1)2
=
(U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)V LE(θ)
(U¯1+U¯2)− (1+S)Vˆ ME(θ)−S(Vˆ M−Vˆ L) θH−θL(mˆ+1)2
> 1.
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Since (mˆ+1)
2
(N+1)2 < 1,
V E−V L
Vˆ E−Vˆ L > 1, i.e.,V
E > Vˆ E . The CEO position at the flatter firm is
more efficient. ‖
Proof of Proposition 7. W E =V LθE(N),W L =V LθL(N),Wˆ EP = Vˆ LθˆEP (mˆ),Wˆ LN =
Vˆ L[ 1mˆ θˆ
L
N(nˆ) + (1− 1mˆ)E(θ)]. From Proposition 6,V E > Vˆ E . From Proposition
3,θE(N)> θˆEP (mˆ). Let’s consider A := θL(N) and B :=
1
mˆ θˆ
L
N(nˆ)+(1− 1mˆ)E(θ). We
know N = Nˆ = mˆ(nˆ+1). Then A := mˆ(nˆ+1)(θH+θL)+2θL2[mˆ(nˆ+1)+1] . B :=
mˆ(nˆ+1)(θH+θL)+2θL−(θH+θL)
2[mˆ(nˆ+1)+1]−2 .
Since A < θH+θL2 , then A > B. That is, the expected ability of a non-promoted la-
borer in a two-layer firm is higher than the expected ability of a non-promoted la-
borer in a three-layer firm. Therefore, if Nˆ =N,Vˆ L =V L, then W E >Wˆ EP ,W
L >Wˆ LN .
From the proof of Proposition 3, the difference in the two expectations E(θ |θ is the largest in n)−
E(θ |θ is not the largest in n) = θH−θL2 · nn+1 increases in n. ∆W = V L[θE(N)−
θL(N)] = V L · θH−θL2 · NN+1 . ∆Wˆ = Vˆ L[θˆEP (mˆ)− 1mˆ θˆLN(nˆ)− mˆ−1mˆ θH+θL2 ]. Let C :=
θˆEP (mˆ)− 1mˆ θˆLN(nˆ)− mˆ−1mˆ θH+θL2 < mˆ
2−mˆ+1
mˆ(mˆ+1) · θH−θL2 = [1− 2mˆ−1mˆ(mˆ+1) ]θH−θL2 . Let D :=
N
N+1 · θH−θL2 = mˆ(nˆ+1)mˆ(nˆ+1)+1 · θH−θL2 = [1− 1mˆ(nˆ+1)+1 ]θH−θL2 . We can see that D >C as
long as mˆ, nˆ > 1. Therefore, ∆W > ∆Wˆ . ‖
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